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Immigration Unilateralism and American
Ethnonationalism
Robert L. Tsai*
This essay places the Trump administration’s immigration and refugee
policy in the context of a resurgent ethnonationalist movement in America
as well as the constitutional politics of the past. In particular, it argues that
Trumpism’s suspicion of foreigners who are Hispanic or Muslim, its move
toward indefinite detention and separation of families, and its disdain for socalled “chain migration” are best understood as part of an assault on the
political settlement of the 1960s. These efforts at demographic control are
being pursued unilaterally, however, without sufficient evidence there is a
broad and lasting desire on the part of the people to alter the fundamental
values generated during that period. In order to withstand Trumpism’s
challenges, we will have to better understand the Immigration and
Naturalization Act’s origins as an integral component of the civil rights
revolution. When we revisit this history, we learn that this settlement
introduced three principles into the immigration context: equality, a
presumption of cultural compatibility, and family integrity. These crucial
principles must be made part of any judicial evaluation of a president’s
policies—especially those conducted unilaterally.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a transformation underway in the United States, but not
everyone recognizes the scope of the challenge or understands how we
have reached this point. It is an ambitious effort that spans a broad range
of policies, institutions, and constitutional doctrines. That plan is to
overthrow the political settlement of the 1960s, which brought us the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1968—landmark laws that codified the grassroots push for
racial equality in the areas of employment, voting, and housing.
Collectively, these laws are understood today as the legal achievements
of the civil rights revolution.
The reaction against this constitutional settlement began almost
immediately. At the time that President Lyndon B. Johnson expended
most of his political capital to ensure passage of these laws, he knew there
would be backlash, the kind that would damage his own party’s electoral
fortunes. America would come to support racial equality, but that
principle has encountered, and so far survived, episodic resistance. Party
realignment followed, as skepticism of equality became channeled
through the national Republican Party as six of the next nine
administrations following Johnson’s have been Republican. While
Johnson’s ignominious handling of America’s involvement in Vietnam
cut short the Democratic Party’s ability to fulfill the promise of the Great
Society, many of the policies inscribed fundamental values and set in
motion chains of events that even political resistance could not
completely roll back.
Now, the Trump administration has opened a new front in the battle to
dislodge the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 (Immigration
Act or Hart-Celler Act). This watershed legislation repudiated the
national-origin quotas of the Immigration Act of 1924 that had long been
considered racist,1 as well as the long-standing preference for migrants
from northern and western Europe, along with the associated logic that
immigrants from elsewhere were culturally incompatible and that they
and their families could be treated differently. However, this monumental
achievement has not been widely appreciated as part of America’s civil
rights legacy. Most accounts of this period leave out the crucial changes
wrought by this law, as well as the criticisms of the older immigration
regime. Like its domestic counterparts, the Immigration Act aimed to

1. As James Whitman has demonstrated, Adolf Hitler admired America’s immigration laws for
“simply exclud[ing] the immigration of certain races.” JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN
MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 46 (2017).
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create America as “a place where people can live in dignity and without
fear.”2
As just one example, Bruce Ackerman, who treats the Civil Rights
Acts as the equivalent of informal constitutional amendments, never
mentions the Immigration Act in his work on this period.3 The 1964 Civil
Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Ackerman writes, revived
and codified the “lost logic” of the “anti-humiliation principle”
announced in Brown v. Board of Education.4 And yet the Immigration
Act, which extends the same principle to cover foreigners—at least those
with some contact with the United States because of their families or their
opportunities—plays no part in his narrative of this epoch and no role in
his theory of constitutional change. It is a glaring omission, for the same
architects of the domestic civil rights laws of the 60s also designed the
Immigration Act to expand the rights of equality, dignity, and family
autonomy. And the same coalition that pressed for legislative action to
reduce inequities in so many other areas of American life approved the
Immigration Act as part of the same political project.5
Our collective failure to appreciate the Immigration Act’s origins as
part of the civil rights revolution has left its transformative quality not
only poorly understood by many Americans, but also politically and
jurisprudentially isolated. It has kept the Immigration Act from fulfilling
its intended role in helping to create an egalitarian society, even as
2. Gabriel J. Chin, Were the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 Antiracist?,
in THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965: LEGISLATING A NEW AMERICA 11, 54
(Gabriel J. Chin & Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2015) [hereinafter LEGISLATING A NEW AMERICA]
(quoting 111 CONG. REC. 21,783 (1965) (statement of Rep. Findley)).
3. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, 3 WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 40–
41 (2014).
4. Id. at 137.
5. Ackerman is not alone in this. The Immigration Act of 1965 is also missing from the account
of “super-statutes” offered by William Eskridge and John Ferejohn. See generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001). Additionally, many
leading biographers of Kennedy and Johnson omit their work on immigration or mention it only in
passing. See, e.g., ROBERT DALLEK, AN UNFINISHED LIFE: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1917–1963 (2003);
RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT KENNEDY: PROFILE OF POWER (1994); While we wait on Robert
Caro’s fifth volume of Johnson’s biography covering 1964–65, it is worth noting that Volume 4
does not mention immigration reform at all. When he writes of Johnson’s “victories in the fight for
social justice,” he mentions the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act, along with
other bills that do not address immigration. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON:
THE PASSAGE OF POWER 604 (2013). An exception is Rogers Smith, who briefly observes that the
politics of equal respect is “clearly expressed” in these landmark laws, including “the 1965
Immigration Act.” ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN
U.S. HISTORY 473 (1997). Hugh Graham says more, including immigration reform among the
“triumphant reforms of 1964–65” that were all “based on the principle of nondiscrimination by race
or national origin.” HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, COLLISION COURSE: THE STRANGE CONVERGENCE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AMERICA 7 (2002).

526

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 51

immigration policy has fallen into a confusing state of conflicting
interests. It gets worse. Now, with the erosion of institutional protections
of basic values surrounding the treatment of migrants once afforded by
the Republican Party and Congress, this part of the civil rights legacy has
suddenly become vulnerable to unilateral assault by a president who
doesn’t accept the hard-won principles laid down in that era.
Lawyers and academics certainly share the blame for not doing more
to highlight the connections between these titanic laws enacted during the
same historical moment. For a long time, this aspect of the 1960s
settlement was not actively opposed by leading figures in the Republican
party. This fact can be seen not only in the success of occasional
bipartisan immigration reform bills throughout the 1980s and 90s, but
also in the favorable ways that Republican presidents once talked about
immigration.6 The key point here is that it’s not just laissez-faire
economics that held together the coalition on immigration—there is also
a basic set of deeply-rooted principles concerning an egalitarian polity
and the family’s role in a democracy that politicians of both parties
embraced.
But things began to change when the United States entered the Age of
Terror, and the momentum has picked up significantly with the
ascendance of Trumpism. While the plan to undermine the 1960s
settlement has been decades in the making, the current president—by
seeking to restore a set of marginalized values through autocratic
methods—has targeted immigration and refugee policy as the new front
for eroding foundational principles. The previous two presidents (George
W. Bush and Barack Obama) could not achieve bipartisan immigration
reform, and the current president has shown no serious interest in meeting
the opposition party halfway. To the contrary, President Donald Trump
has decided to go it alone on immigration, using the powers of the
6. For example, in 2006, then-President George W. Bush urged Congress to enact immigration
reform and described “the vast majority of illegal immigrants” as “decent people who work hard,
support their families, practice their faith, and lead responsible lives.” Instead of painting them as
interlopers, he called them “part of American life,” though they may be “beyond the reach and
protection of American law.” George W. Bush, Speech on Immigration (May 15, 2006) (transcript
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/15/washington/15text-bush.html [https://perma.cc/
SZU2-G4Z6]). Or as Ronald Reagan said in 1980, standing with the Statue of Liberty as a
backdrop:
Others came to America in different ways, from other lands, under different, often
harrowing conditions, but this place symbolizes what they all managed to build, no
matter where they came from or how they came or how much they suffered. . . . They
brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, neighborhood, work,
peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they shared the same values, the
same dream.
Ronald Reagan, Labor Day Speech at Liberty State Park, Jersey City, NJ (Sept. 1, 1980),
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/9-1-80 [https://perma.cc/6YXG-38U3].
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presidency to unsettle that aspect of the civil rights legacy, despite
widespread support for that political achievement. Similarly, he has put
appointees in crucial positions for the purpose of returning to a highly
selective “country-of-origin” approach to immigration policy and to treat
Hispanic and Muslim migrants differently from other immigrants, often
based on vague assertions of group-based threat.
Americans are now reaping the fruits of our own inattention. A firsttime presidential candidate, who had never held elected office, rode a
wave of grassroots dissatisfaction with demographic changes all the way
to the White House, despite losing the popular vote. Trump campaigned
on ethno-nationalist themes shared by other right-wing candidates
throughout Europe. He promised to force others to bend to his will on
matters like immigration and trade, and to act alone if others disagreed.
By outflanking his opponents to their right on such issues, he bet his
presidency on taking a hardline view on every matter that arguably
implicated American demographics and foreign trade: refugee policy that
discriminates on the basis of religion and country of origin, 7 expanded
use of detention camps for unauthorized migrants, family separation as
deterrence, renewed discrimination against the poor, ending automatic
citizenship for the children of soldiers and federal workers born in
another country,8 and trying to build a physical wall along the southern
border. President Trump has undertaken virtually all of these initiatives
on his own, without the express support of Congress.
Ominously, the Supreme Court gave Trump a victory on his signature
issue when it employed a highly deferential approach to judicial review
and upheld the president’s unilateral travel ban against several Muslimmajority countries.9 That narrow 5-4 victory in Trump v. Hawaii has not
chastened the president or his allies; to the contrary, it has emboldened
hardliners to do more before the clock on Trump’s presidency runs out.
Meanwhile, the rest of the federal judiciary has been left to grapple with
a wide range of efforts to seize decisive control of immigration
policymaking from Congress.

7. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978 (Feb. 1, 2017) (prohibiting immigration
from a list of predominantly Muslim countries).
8. See Maria Sacchetti, Trump Administration Ends Automatic Citizenship for Some Children
of Military, Federal Workers Born Abroad, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trump-administration-ends-automatic-citizenshipfor-some-children-of-military-federal-workers-born-abroad/2019/08/28/29b811c6-c9d7-11e9a1fe-ca46e8d573c0_story.html [https://perma.cc/K4P6-NHTD] (explaining the impact of
President Trump’s Executive Order No. 13,769).
9. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
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As we approach the end of Trump’s first term in office, the judges he
has appointed will have more opportunities to weigh in on his unilateral
actions. Culled from among conservative jurists who grew up as part of
the reaction to the civil rights movement, they are already steeped in the
ideological ferment of post-sixties conservativism.10 But some could
have an even harder edge, believers in the efficacy of the national security
state or perhaps even in the virtues of an America where political powers
remains decisively in the hands of white voters. These judges may be
willing to back the president’s play to seize whatever power can still be
exerted constitutionally over the country’s demographics and ratify
further weakening of the anti-discrimination principle.
What accounts for the neglect that has left us so flat-footed? Part of it
comes from the proponents of changes to the nation’s immigration laws
back in the 1960s, who generally played down the significance of those
reforms. Some commentators have taken those statements at face value
rather than treat them as strategic comments intended to assuage anxieties
about the changing makeup of America.11 Part of this silo-style approach
to understanding our political history has to do with a nagging tendency
to see civil rights laws as internal matters, and immigration as regulation
of external matters. Perhaps some of this mistake is the byproduct of a
quite understandable desire to honor the hard work of civil rights
protesters who put their lives and bodies on the line for racial equality.
But as some observers have finally started to point out, the massive
changes in immigration law during the 1960s had everything to do with
the civil rights movement.12 The architects of the Great Society believed
that the changes to immigration law flowed naturally from the egalitarian
premises that drove the enactment of those other civil rights laws.
10. On the views and influence of the Federalist Society in shaping the views of conservative
jurists, see e.g. STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW ); Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the Conservative
Counterrevolution, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1698 (2018).
11. See JUAN WILLIAMS, WE THE PEOPLE: THE MODERN-DAY FIGURES WHO HAVE
RESHAPED AND AFFIRMED THE FOUNDING FATHERS’ VISION OF AMERICA 30–32 (2016).
12. See LEGISLATING A NEW AMERICA, supra note 2, at 2 (“[T]he 1965 Immigration Act, like
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, adopted a norm of
nondiscrimination.”); BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1850–1990, at 18 (1993) (contending that the Immigration Act of 1965
aspired to a “new global egalitarianism”); see generally Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution
Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C.
L. REV. 273 (1996) (arguing that Congress knowingly eased restrictions on Asian immigration
following discriminatory immigration laws of the past). Even those leading the assault on the 1960s
settlement ridicule it as “Teddy Kennedy’s 1965 immigration act [that] extended ‘civil rights’ to
the entire world.” ANN COULTER, ¡ADIOS, AMERICA!: THE LEFT’S PLAN TO TURN OUR COUNTRY
INTO A THIRD WORLD HELLHOLE 70 (2015).
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Furthermore, pro-equality activists were a far more interesting bunch than
just the famous figures most often written about in the history books. A
broader view of the civil rights movement, too, shows that many
members of the coalition had a transnational account of equality and
justice. For this coalition—which included religious believers, union
members, and Cold War warriors—the imperative to do the work of
equality did not stop at the border; defeating Jim Crow was just the
beginning. As a matter of good history and accurate theory of popular
sovereignty, then, the Immigration Act should be understood as part of
an intended durable political settlement.
Certainly critics on the right see the far-reaching effects of immigration
reform, even if they treat the Hart-Celler Act as nothing more than an
ordinary piece of legislation that can be circumvented or cast aside. Many
also talk as if the demographic changes ushered by the Immigration Act
of 1965 were totally unanticipated.13 These figures have taken aim
squarely at the law, preferring to take us back to the 1924 regime of
immigration regulation, where national origin discrimination and racial
supremacy was a regular feature of demographic control. Before Trump
tapped him for Attorney General, Jeff Sessions spent decades working
with anti-immigration groups warning Americans about not only the
presence of undocumented aliens, but also the increase of non-white
immigration since 1965. He issued reports expressing alarm about the
rising ratio of “foreign-born” to “native-born” people in America and
arguing that “[the United States] passed a law that went far beyond what
anybody realized in 1965, and we’re on the path to surge far past what
the situation was in 1924.”14 His message was unmistakable and
established the blueprint for the current administration: roll back
immigration to its pre-1965 methods, logic, and results.
This is the political history against which we must understand the
Trump administration’s efforts to alter immigration law unilaterally. It is
critical background that is almost always left out of today’s reporting and
judicial decision making. The current administration’s latest push to
expand immigration-related policies to the detriment of “public
13. See, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER, at xv (1995) (claiming that 1965 Immigration Act “quite accidentally,
triggered a renewed mass migration”).
14. Adam Serwer, Jeff Sessions’s Unqualified Praise for a 1924 Immigration Law, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/jeff-sessions-1924immigration/512591/ [https://perma.cc/5Z36-ZT9Y]; see Robert L. Tsai & Calvin TerBeek,
Trumpism Before Trump, BOS. REV. (June 11, 2018), http://bostonreview.net/politics/robert-tsaicalvin-terbeek-trumpism-trump [https://perma.cc/EX77-DXR6] (explaining that Trump’s cultural
approach to immigration restrictionism is one that grassroots conservatives have espoused for years
prior to his presidency).
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charges,”15 or to move to indefinite detention of migrants,16 or even to
end birthright citizenship by executive order,17 are not random moves,
but rather part of this concerted effort to dislodge the political settlement
of the 1960s. Ostensibly, administration officials say they are acting
within the existing legal framework created by Congress and, taken in
isolation, certain actions may seem to be. But in both tenor and substance,
key officials and their supporters are committed to wholesale revision of
a constitutional settlement through unilateral means. Instead of working
with Congress to alter immigration law, President Trump is exploiting
the populist model of presidential leadership to build external support for
acting alone.
I. THE IMMIGRATION SETTLEMENT OF 1965
The story of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 is a long
and complicated one, but several aspects of that experience stand out. To
begin, the law extended the anti-discrimination principle to regulate the
entry of foreigners by eradicating what President Lyndon B. Johnson
called “the twin barriers of prejudice and privilege.” 18 The political
settlement out of which this egalitarian principle arose was itself an effort
to fulfill the promise of an earlier settlement: Reconstruction. The
egalitarian project begun by the Reconstruction generation had been cut
short by backlash from white Americans who utilized a combination of
old and new methods to limit the reach of the principle, and from
conservative jurists whose parsimonious interpretations of the
Constitution blunted the transformative potential of the Fourteenth and
15. Michael D. Shear & Emily Baumgaertner, Trump Administration Aims to Sharply Restrict
New Green Cards for Those on Public Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/09/22/us/politics/immigrants-green-card-public-aid.html [https://perma.cc/N2UV-2BFE].
16. Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Migrant Families Would Face Indefinite
Detention Under New Trump Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/08/21/us/politics/flores-migrant-family-detention.html [https://perma.cc/PH9A-2G69].
17. President Trump has repeatedly parroted the words and goals of immigration restrictionists
who believe that birthright citizenship, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, is a “magnet for
illegal immigration.” Immigration Reform that Will Make America Great Again, DONALD J. TRUMP
FOR PRESIDENT (Aug. 16, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20160930213559/https://assets.
donaldjtrump.com/Immigration-Reform-Trump.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BDY-89FS]. Trump has
even said he feels that he can abolish it by executive order. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, President Wants
to Use Executive Order to End Birthright Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/us/politics/trump-birthright-citizenship.html
[https://perma.cc/RTU8-7WKF] (summarizing President Trump’s threat to end by executive order
the long-accepted constitutional guarantee of birthright citizenship).
18. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island,
NY (Oct. 3, 1965) [hereinafter Johnson’s Immigration Bill Remarks] (on file with the Government
Printing Office in Washington, D.C.) (transcript available at http://www.lbjlibrary.org/lyndonbaines-johnson/timeline/lbj-on-immigration [https://perma.cc/G9CZ-A4KM]).
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Fifteenth Amendments. And so the civil rights generation resumed this
unfinished work.
Among the historians that observe the continuities among Johnson’s
Great Society initiatives extending to immigration, Robert Dallek tells us
that Johnson “pressed Congress to make fundamental changes in the
National Origins Act of 1924.”19 Dallek thinks that, as a Southerner who
felt the sting of regionalist prejudices, Johnson identified with foreigners
and minorities who faced analogous mistreatment based on their place of
origin.20 As Johnson explained when he signed it into law, the Hart-Celler
Act “is . . . one of the most important acts of this Congress and of this
administration.”21 His public declaration was consistent with what he told
Speaker of the House John McCormack: “There is no piece of legislation
before the Congress that in terms of decency and equity is more
demanding of passage than the Immigration bill.”22
Notice that Johnson elevated the immigration reform law to a special
status among the other landmark laws advanced by the administration.
He also talked about immigration reform in the parlance of democratic
justice. It was intended to “repair a very deep and painful flaw in the
fabric of American justice” and “correct[] a cruel and enduring wrong in
the conduct of the American Nation.”23 Johnson explained that the
immigration law was part of the same “vision” shared by John F.
Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, and championed by Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach, along with Senators Ted Kennedy, Jacob Javits,
Mike Mansfield, and Everett Dirksen.24 As Robert Kennedy himself
testified before Congress, considering individuals on “merit . . . is the
whole philosophy of the immigration bill, and that that was the whole
philosophy of the civil rights bills of 1963 and 1964 and the voting rights
bill of 1965.”25
Johnson characterized the previous approach to immigration policy as
“twisted and . . . distorted by the harsh injustice of the national origins
quota system.”26 Under the previous system, which was based on country
of origin and “grounded in nineteenth century doctrines of scientific

19. ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND HIS TIMES 1961–1973, at 227–
28 (1998).
20. Id.
21. Johnson’s Immigration Bill Remarks, supra note 18.
22. ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND HIS TIMES 1961–1973, at 227–
28 (1998).
23. Johnson’s Immigration Bill Remarks, supra note 18.
24. Id.
25. 111 CONG. REC. 24,778 (1965) (statement of Sen. Robert Kennedy).
26. Johnson’s Immigration Bill Remarks, supra note 18.
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racism,”27 he said, “[o]nly 3 countries were allowed to supply 70 percent
of all the immigrants.”28 He made clear that “this system is abolished”
the moment he affixed his signature to the bill. Instead, he announced the
restoration of the principles of merit and family integrity within the
immigration system. No longer would families be “kept apart because a
husband or a wife or a child had been born in the wrong place.”
Henceforth, “those wishing to immigrate to America shall be admitted on
the basis of their skills and their close relationship to those already here.”
This would finally be consistent with “the basic principle of American
democracy . . . that values and rewards each man on the basis of his merit
as a man.”29
Johnson’s emphasis on the themes of equality, dignity, merit,
contribution, and family were all pillars of the Great Society he hoped to
build, but they were also consistent with the fallen president’s views on
immigration reform. Before his life was cut short by the assassin’s bullet,
President Kennedy himself had urged Congress to do away with the quota
system in order to “develop[] an immigration law that serves the national
interest and reflects in every detail the principles of equality and human
dignity to which our nation subscribes.”30 That meant, he said, admitting
individuals “with the greatest ability to add to the national welfare, no
matter where they were born . . . The next priority should go to those who
seek to be reunited with their relatives.”31 The norm against national
origin discrimination would be confirmed and extended in 1968 when
Congress applied it to the private housing market.32
On the same day that he signed the law, President Johnson also
announced that, consistent with the spirit of this new approach to
migration, America would welcome refugees from Cuba. “The
dedication of America to our traditions as an asylum for the oppressed is
going to be upheld,” he assured.33 Priority among asylum seekers would
be given to “those Cubans who have been separated from their children
and their parents and their husbands and their wives and that are now in

27. GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 50.
28. Johnson’s Immigration Bill Remarks, supra note 18.
29. Id.
30. Letter from President John F. Kennedy to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House on Revision of the Immigration Laws (July 23, 1963).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73.
33. Johnson’s Immigration Bill Remarks, supra note 18.
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this country.”34 The second priority would be made for “those who are
imprisoned for political reasons.”35
Johnson was not alone. During debate over the immigration bill,
congressmen repeatedly emphasized that the new legal framework would
restore “America’s ideal of equality of all men without regard to race,
color, creed, or national origin.”36 Others put it terms of dignity, so that
the law would “judge each individual by his own worth” rather than as a
“pawn of society or the State.”37 Representative Leonard Farbstein put it
in the strongest terms possible: “Embodied in this bill is a realization and
a recognition which has become widespread in this Nation rather
belatedly . . . I am speaking of the recognition of the basic equality of all
men.”38 These comments show that legislators understood exactly what
they were doing: embracing a liberal assimilationist approach to
immigration and discarding an ascriptive approach that assumed some
people—whether according to race or happenstance of birth location—
were less worthy that others to become full members of the political
community.
There is much more work to be done to fully tell this story, but Jack
Chin, who has done yeoman’s work reconstructing the history
surrounding the Immigration Act of 1965,39 points out additional factors
that underscore the transformative quality of the legislative changes.
First, the basic structure of the changes made it very predictable that the
proportion of non-white immigrants would go up dramatically. Increased
migration from countries hit hardest by the older caps was expected by
nearly all the key players involved.40 As Chin observes through careful
research of the legislative record, legislators repeatedly asked about likely
demographic changes and were told explicitly that “[t]here may be people
coming in greater numbers from different areas of the world.”41
Moreover, they realized that lifting “[d]iscriminatory provisions against
immigrants from eastern and southern Europe, token quotas for Asian and
African countries, and implications of race superiority in the Asia-Pacific

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 111 CONG. REC. 21,786 (1965) (statement of Rep. Helstoski).
37. 111 CONG. REC. 21,778 (statement of Rep. Krebs); 111 CONG. REC. 21,771 (statement of
Rep. Gilbert); 111 CONG. REC. 21,807 (statement of Rep. Fino) (noting that the United States has
always believed in the “fundamental truth that all men, regardless of race, color or religion, are
created equal”).
38. 111 CONG. REC. 21,784 (statement of Rep. Farbstein).
39. Chin, supra note 2, at 20 n.67.
40. Id. at 26–40.
41. Id. at 29.
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triangle concept” would surely increase migration from those regions of
the world.42
Second, the same basic coalition that supported the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 also voted in favor of the
Immigration Act of 1965. Religious and ethnic groups drove the changes,
while labor unions and black civil rights leaders “maintained liberal
solidarity by supporting immigration reform.”43 Conversely, the same
folks who voted against those laws similarly voted against the
Immigration law. As Chin and Douglas Spencer demonstrate:
The percent of overlapping support between the CRA and INA [was]
86.6% in the House and 91.2% in the Senate. . . . Nearly ninety percent
of the yea votes for the INA were by members of Congress that had
supported the VRA just one month earlier. In all, 196 members of the
House and sixty-one senators supported all three bills.44

Although Hugh Davis Graham attributes the passage of the
Immigration Act more to lobbying and logrolling than lengthy legislative
debates, he acknowledges that “every Jewish member of Congress in both
chambers voted for it, as did all Catholics in the Senate and all but 3 (of
92) in the House. Most of the opposition came from southern
Democrats,” who similarly opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.45
In fact, polls taken to measure public support for the Civil Rights Act
and the Immigration Act in 1965 showed comparable support for both:
58 percent and 51 percent, respectively.46 Another poll put support for
the new immigration law even higher when asked for a thumbs up or
down: 70 percent.47 It’s notable that roughly a third of respondents

42. Id. at 30–31 n.126–28 (citing 111 CONG. REC. 24,238 (statement of Sen. Hart)).
43. GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 63.
44. Gabriel J. Chin & Douglas M. Spencer, Did Multicultural America Result from a Mistake?
The 1965 Immigration Act and Evidence from Roll Call Votes, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1239, 1251–
52 (2015); see also Chin, supra note 2, at 20 n.67.
45. GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 64; see also KEVIN M. KRUSE & JULIAN E. ZELIZER, FAULT
LINES: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1974, at 56 (2019).
46. Andrew Kohut, 50 Years Ago: Mixed Views About Civil Rights but Support for Selma
Demonstrators, PEW RES. CTR. FACT TANK (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/03/05/50-years-ago-mixed-views-about-civil-rights-but-support-for-selmademonstrators [https://perma.cc/M5LB-6XBB]; Lydia Saad, In 1965, Americans Favored
Immigration Based on Family Ties, GALLUP (Jan. 12, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/vault/
225401/1965-americans-favored-immigration-family-ties.aspx [https://perma.cc/LQ8U-3PS5].
47. Huddled Masses: Public Opinion & the 1965 U.S. Immigration Act Blog, ROPER CTR. (July
10,
2015),
https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/blog/huddled-masses-public-opinion-1965-usimmigration-act-blog [https://perma.cc/8P53-RNP7].
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thought country of origin should matter,48 while 55 percent supported
family ties.49
Third, part of the way the notion of equality worked in the immigration
domain (as opposed to work, voting, or housing) is that, beyond putting
overt racial animus off limits, it overturned a long-held skepticism of
cultural incompatibility. Such suspicion of foreign peoples and their
cultures of origin was a lasting scar from earlier approaches in dealing
with poor Irish and Chinese migrants and stretching all the way back to
the country’s reservation of naturalization only for “free white
person[s].”50 Rather than treating immigrants as “incorrigible vassals of
a racial, ethnic, or national strain,” the new approach would evaluate
foreigners as prospective “future Americans.”51
Senator Ted Kennedy’s remarks are also instructive in this regard. The
position that prevailed presumed that individuals who come to America
seeking a better life could be assimilated. Experience had disproved the
“fear” that immigrants “will not assimilate into our society,” he
reported.52 To the contrary, “their adjustment has been notable.”53
Kennedy added: “In an age of global television and the universality of
American culture, their assimilation, in a real sense, begins before they
come here.”54 By contrast, the presumptions of cultural incompatibility
associated with the losing position were now “out of line with the
obligations of responsible citizenship. They breed hate of our heritage.”55
Fourth, “family reunification” emerged as a Cold War imperative—a
dynamic that had similarly driven equality gains for black Americans
after emancipation, largely through the work of the Freedmen’s Bureau
operated by the War Department. Graham points out that “lobbying by
ethnic and religious groups with strong ties to eastern and southern
Europe” produced a wave of sympathy for families split from some
relatives fleeing from totalitarian governments or Communist revolutions
in places like Cuba.56 In this environment, Graham and others say,
“supporting liberalized family reunification policies offered members of

48. Id.
49. Saad, supra note 46.
50. An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790), repealed
by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20.
51. 111 CONG. REC. 21,818 (1965) (statement of Rep. Conte).
52. 111 CONG. REC. 24,228 (1965) (statement of Sen. Robert Kennedy).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 58.
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Congress,” especially from diverse metropolitan areas, “great political
payoff with virtually no negatives.”57
To say that the Immigration Act is an indispensable facet of the 1960s
settlement is not to say that the law fulfilled all of these objectives
perfectly. Legislators understood that the egalitarian norm would operate
slightly differently in each domain. When it came to admission to the
country, national security could still come into play in certain situations.
Even on family reunification, the reality is that many families have
remained separated due to long waiting periods and other legal and
practical obstacles.58 Moreover, country of origin remained essential to
how refugee matters were handled.59 But that only means that the equality
principle is more nuanced rather than inoperable. There was now a new
constitutional norm regarding how potential immigrants would be
treated: with equal respect and a presumption that they, and close family
members, would have a fair shot at the American Dream, regardless of
the happenstance of birthplace.
II. TRUMPISM’S ASSAULT ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS SETTLEMENT
Trumpism has attempted to harness a wide range of cultural and
demographic concerns and direct that dissatisfaction to de-legitimize and
undermine the 1960s settlement. What we are seeing is an ethnonationalist movement that has been fused with a more traditional
conservative movement that is skeptical of social progress, focused on
continuing economic prosperity, and committed to reducing the size of
the administrative state.60 Thus, Trumpism contains remnants of earlier
conservative movements, including the Moral Majority, the Tea Party,

57. Id.; see generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS
(1999).
58. Rose Cuison Villazor, The 1965 Immigration Act: Family Unification and
Nondiscrimination Fifty Years Later, in LEGISLATING A NEW AMERICA, supra note 2, at 197, 221.
59. Brian Soucek, The Last Preference: Refugees and the 1965 Immigration Act, in
LEGISLATING A NEW AMERICA, supra note 2, at 171, 171. It must be pointed out that the 1965
Immigration Act’s new approach did away with unlimited Western Hemisphere migration. See
Kevin R. Johnson, The Beginning of the End: The Immigration Act of 1965 and the Emergence of
the Modern U.S.-Mexico Broder State, in LEGISLATING A NEW AMERICA, supra note 2, at 116,
116–19 (arguing that the 1965 immigration law discriminated against Latinos by imposing a ceiling
of 120,000 immigrants from the Western Hemisphere).
60. See generally Sidney M. Milkis & Nicholas Jacobs, ‘I Alone Can Fix It’ Donald Trump, the
Administrative Presidency, and Hazards of Executive-Centered Partisanship, 15 FORUM 583, 609
(2017) (observing the Trump administration’s use of executive orders as well as “a slew of less
visible strategies” to push deregulation of corporations and open protected lands to energy
exploration).
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militia, and white nationalist movements that have occupied the far-right
over the last several decades.61
As a political and social movement, Trumpism possesses several
defining features. First, it is primarily a grassroots movement fueled by
popular grievances over demographic and cultural changes in American
society as well as the social and economic dislocations created by the
global economy—what Steve Bannon, Donald Trump’s former campaign
chairman, called “a populist nationalist conservative revolt . . . against
the elites in this country,” especially “the globalists among those
elites.”62 This can be seen in the major themes of Trump’s candidacy
about “American carnage” wrought by foreign powers and strange
cultures. In addition, these themes can be observed in his insistence that
black athletes stop taking a knee to protest police brutality and the
administration’s opposition to the Black Lives Matter movement.
Second, in tone and symbolism, Trumpism presents itself as a
restoration movement, an effort to turn the clock back to simpler times
when social roles seemed more predictable when it comes to race, sex,
and religion. Bannon and his acolytes call their project protecting “the
Judeo-Christian West.”63 Whether or not such an age of perfect politicalreligious governance ever really existed, this nostalgia-fueled vision
harkens back to Nixon’s “law and order” discourse repurposed against
undocumented migrants, Muslims, and “Leftists.” An enhanced concern
with demographic control to ensure the political power of white,
Christian voters, the economic prospects of corporations and dislocated
white workers, and conservatives’ concerns of cultural degradation fits
comfortably within this movement. As Hofstadter might have put it,
adherents of Trumpism are grateful that their leader-spokesman is
“always manning the barricades of civilization.”64
Originally, Bannon’s vision involved a worker-led takeover of the
Republican Party and the formation of a center-right coalition to both
defeat the progressive left and destroy the neo-liberal economic
establishment within both parties.65 The goal was to achieve an
61. See KRUSE & ZELIZER, supra note 45, at 88–112 (discussing the rise of the conservative
reaction to the 1960s); see generally JOSEPH LOWNDES, FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT:
RACE AND THE SOUTHERN ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSERVATISM (2008).
62. Robert Kuttner, Steve Bannon, Unleashed, PROSPECT (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://prospect.org/power/steve-bannon-unleashed/ [https://perma.cc/3RRV-MV7Y].
63. J. Lester Feder, This Is How Steve Bannon Sees the Entire World, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov.
15, 2016), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/lesterfeder/this-is-how-steve-bannon-sees-theentire-world [https://perma.cc/NKZ5-9LFA].
64. Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, HARPER’S MAG., Nov. 1964,
at 77–86.
65. Feder, supra note 63. Bannon’s ouster has left the bulk of economic policy in the hands of
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“enlightened” form of capitalism as well as remake American citizenship
in a way that transcended individualistic and tribal identities. 66 Bannon
always understood that the grassroots efforts on the right would include
white nationalists but believed that that element would eventually burn
itself out after its utility dried up—along with other forms of social group
identification.67 Yet white nationalists such as Peter Brimelow, David
Duke, and Richard Spencer all looked to Bannon and his allies within the
administration to keep Trump’s promises to restrict immigration and
thereby protect white culture and political power by any means
possible.68
Third, immigration has been the main issue binding a fractious set of
communities to Trump’s banner. Trump’s lock on the party’s base comes
from his repeated return to the rhetoric and dark view of ethnic and racial
pluralism shared by the base of the modern Republican Party and his
muscular use of the presidency’s powers to take consistent action in this
area. By harnessing the anti-immigration work and strategies of such
figures as Bannon, Jeff Sessions, Stephen Miller, and Kris Kobach,
Trumpism relies heavily upon demographic control as the means to
restore a sense of cultural integrity and prevent the loss of political power
for a white majority.
Part of the fury surrounding immigration and refugee policy stems
from a sense of desperation among restrictionists. Older modes of
demographic control now lie beyond the constitutional pale: interracial
marriage and overt regimes of racial separation are no longer
countenanced. Progressive reformers have also in recent years stepped up
challenges to racial and partisan gerrymandering, strategies that have
long been used to preserve the political dominance of white populations
in America. The narrowing range of options for Americans concerned
about cultural change and the dilution of white power has merely
intensified border control and immigration policy as the sites for
contesting the future of American culture and the nature of political
community.
corporate interests.
66. Id.
67. Eric Bradner, Bannon Rejects White Nationalism: “I’m an Economic Nationalist”, CNN
(Nov. 21, 2016, 6:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/21/politics/steve-bannon-donald-trumpnationalist/index.html [https://perma.cc/4DM7-VWAS] (quoting Bannon: “I have admired
nationalist movements throughout the world, have said repeatedly strong nations make great
neighbors. I've also said repeatedly that the ethno-nationalist movement, prominent in Europe, will
change over time.”).
68. Andrew Kaczynski & Chris Massie, White Nationalists See Advocate in Steve Bannon Who
Will Hold Trump to His Campaign Promises, CNN (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/
2016/11/14/politics/white-nationalists-on-bannon/index.html [https://perma.cc/8FD6-TWJC].
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As Miller—the overseer of White House immigration policies after
Bannon’s departure from the administration—explained, the goal is to
return to a period like “from 1920 to 1970,” where “the foreign-born
population shrank.”69 Here, “foreign-born” has become the preferred
lingua franca for immigration restrictionists who wish to signal concern
about migrants from Central and South America, Africa, and Asia, while
avoiding charges of racism.
Thus, the issue of undocumented migrants has always been a stalking
horse. The real “beating heart of the problem,” as the architects of
Trump’s immigration policy acknowledged in quieter moments, has
always been legal immigration.70 The assault on the civil rights
settlement of the 1960s encompasses cultural conservatives who are
queasy about the lack of a thick set of beliefs that bind a polity, as well
as white nationalists who are more powerfully committed to preserving
governance in the hands of white voters in the face of demographic
changes.
Consider the best-selling book Alien Nation by Peter Brimelow, a
figure whose work has been influential in anti-immigration circles.
Unlike many commentators, Brimelow acknowledges that
“antidiscrimination legislators . . . framed the 1965 Immigration Act.”71
But he worries that “[t]o the extent that the 1965 Immigration Act is seen
as part of the Civil Rights triumph, it is above criticism—let alone
reform.”72 So he makes the strategic choice to try to undermine the entire
civil rights legacy, saying that “The Civil Rights battle has left deep and
permanent scars on America” and fostered a reflexive tendency to
describe “a wide range of social questions . . . as problems of
‘discrimination.’”73 To Brimelow, the Immigration Act was a product of
“Civil Rights reflex.”74 He contends that egalitarianism has no proper
role in immigration policy because “immigration policy is inherently
discriminatory.”75 He then goes on to doubt that any multicultural society
can survive and argues that immigration “threaten[s] a country’s political
balance.”76

69. Tara Golshan, Steve Bannon in 2016: Legal Immigration Is the Real “Problem”, VOX (Feb.
2,
2017),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/2/2/14472404/steve-bannon-legalimmigration-problem [https://perma.cc/WN6S-KEUX] (quoting Stephen Miller).
70. Id. (quoting Steve Bannon).
71. BRIMELOW, supra note 13, at 104.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 103.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 104.
76. Id. at 123–29, 193.
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Sessions, who once mentored Miller and was given a bigger media
platform by Bannon while toiling at the fringes of the Republican Party,
repeatedly emphasized these same themes. In a 2015 memo he circulated
to colleagues, he complained, “[t]he last four decades have witnessed the
following: a period of record, uncontrolled immigration to the United
States.”77 It was clear even then that he wanted a return to the
discriminatory regime that had been repudiated in 1965. “Since end of
the 1960s,” he wrote, “the share of the U.S. population that is foreignborn has increased from less than 5 percent to more than 13 percent. As
a total number, the size of the foreign-born population has quadrupled
over the last four decades.”78 Elsewhere, he has explicitly criticized the
Immigration Act and advocated a return to the 1924 law.79
Fifth, as a candidate, Trump was able to graft this grassroots movement
onto an existing politico-economic structure that has for decades
advanced the economic priorities of the merchant class regardless of
party. This has not led to a wholesale repudiation of the neoliberal order,
but instead to a selective and awkward merging of elite and populist
philosophies. That, plus his willingness to turn over the repopulation of
the federal judiciary to organizations dedicated to “originalist” methods
and traditionalist ideologies, helped Trump secure a certain degree of
loyalty and expertise from party elites, as well as the conservative legal
bar.80 To the extent the goals of conservative elites align with those of
Trumpism, philosophical disagreements have been subordinated to
partisan advancement or economic gain. Those with a darker view of the
liberal tradition have mostly welcomed the degradation of liberal norms
and institutions, even if they do not share Trumpism’s ideological
commitments, believing that liberal democracy’s decline might pave a
return to traditional forms of governance or perhaps something entirely
new.
Since Trump assumed office, the tensions between the goals of his
most enthusiastic supporters—which include a mix of street brawling
groups like the Proud Boys, fringe law men like Joe Arpaio and Darren
Clarke,81 and avowed white nationalists and identitarians—and the goals
77. JEFF SESSIONS, IMMIGRATION HANDBOOK FOR THE NEW REPUBLICAN MAJORITY 1
(2015).
78. Id. at 10.
79. Serwer, supra note 14.
80. For excellent work on the conservative legal movement, see TELES, supra note 10
(examining efforts to make the legal system more conservative); ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS
OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008) (outlining types of
lawyers that have united behind the Republican Party).
81. Robert L. Tsai, The Troubling Sheriffs’ Movement That Joe Arpaio Supports, POLITICO
(Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/01/joe-arpaio-pardon-sheriffsmovement-215566 [https://perma.cc/25BH-AVR8].

2019]

Immigration Unilateralism & American Ethnonationalism

541

of conservative members of the merchant class have largely been
managed through gestures and policies. His bombastic leadership style
has kept the culture warriors in his fold, while creating headaches for his
elite supporters. But many of those elites have been pacified that the
merchant class has so far won nearly all of the fights on taxes, the
economy, and social welfare policies.
Civil rights and immigration are two areas where grassroots activists
have enjoyed the greatest impact on the substance of administration
policies. Trump officials have taken traditionalist positions on
transgender rights across the board, in the military, in public schools, and
in the workplace—despite contrary positions taken by the EEOC and
some mild opposition by the Education Department.82 On the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Trump administration’s Department of Justice
argued that the proper interpretation of the word “sex” is biological, and
therefore excludes, through statutory silence, discrimination against
sexual minorities.83 In another attack on civil rights, Trump’s DOJ has
also moved across the board to release police departments from consent
decrees arising from police brutality and misconduct allegations.84
On immigration, Trump’s strategy resembles the executive-led
transformation of the law after the 9/11 attacks: built on broad claims of
national security, increased reliance on emergency governance, little to
no consultation with or approval from Congress on his most controversial
moves, and reliance upon government lawyers to help justify executive
actions that push the boundaries of existing law.

82. Kristin Lam, Homeless Shelters Could Deny Transgender People Under Proposed Trump
Administration Rule, USA TODAY (May 23, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2019/05/22/transgender-homeless-protections-discrimination-hud-proposal/1199509001/
[https://perma.cc/4X9E-S94R]; Paul Sonne & Ann E. Marimow, Military to Begin Enforcing
Trump’s Restrictions on Transgender Troops, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/military-to-begin-enforcingrestrictions-on-trumps-transgender-troops/2019/03/13/cf2a0530-4587-11e9-972650f151ab44b9_story.html [https://perma.cc/C39V-ZBP3].
83. Brief for the Federal Respondent Supporting Reversal at 16, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (mem.) (No. 18-107), 2019 WL 3942898 at *16
(arguing that Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination “because of sex” does not
extend to “transgender status” and “does not constitute sex stereotyping prohibited by Title VII”).
84. Katie Benner, Sessions, in Last-Minute Act, Sharply Limits Use of Consent Decrees to Curb
Police Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/us/politics/
sessions-limits-consent-decrees.html [https://perma.cc/6GYC-N3BL]; see also Memorandum from
Attorney General Jeff Sessions to Heads of Litigating Components and United States Attorneys,
Principles and Procedures for Civil Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements with State and
Local Governmental Entities (Nov. 7, 2018) (on file with the United States Justice Department in
Washington, D.C.) (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1109681/download
[https://perma.cc/R3EY-CZB4]).

542

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 51

The model of strong presidential leadership advanced by past
presidents such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan, and George W.
Bush has now paved the way for more unilateral action rather than
bipartisan legislation. The principal difference is that the model of
executive action is now being exploited by someone who does not feel
constrained by a broad range of governing norms, such as convincing a
majority of voters of the wisdom of his ideas, horse trading with
legislators from the opposing party to achieve legislation, or worrying
about his party’s future electoral success beyond his own tenure. This is
almost certainly Trump’s one and only run in electoral politics, so future
elective ambition is missing as a curb on this president’s words and deeds.
A continuing decline in the general norm of bipartisanship, coupled
with the erosion of consensus over who should be primarily responsible
for immigration policy is a recipe fit for exploitation by a populistautocrat. For all practical purposes, all a president’s legislative allies have
to do is hold off one house in Congress.85 So far, assertive presidential
leadership plus partisan obstruction has worked, allowing Trump to read
existing law in a fashion that favors singular action and to overwhelm the
judiciary through a series of aggressive enforcement actions, new
regulations, and defensive skirmishes once lawsuits are inevitably filed.
The administration’s lawyers believe this approach will buy time to build
political support for his bold actions and ultimately yield wins before the
Supreme Court. To that end, they have sought to expedite as many cases
as possible to that more favorable venue while Trump appointees
continue to fill the lower federal courts.86
So far, the administration’s policies in the immigration domain have
exhibited the following characteristics. First, the administration has taken
a number of steps to centralize decision-making authority over
immigration and refugee policy. Power has been kept closely guarded in
the hands of a few White House aides, with allies outside the White
85. It should be pointed out that President Obama himself exploited the populist model of
presidential leadership to establish the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program,
contributing to the erosion of these norms of bipartisan control over immigration policy, even
though he was doing so in the service of other principles: fairness, family integrity, and so on.
86. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123,
125, 134 (2019) (observing that between January 2017 and October 2019, “the Solicitor General
has sought stays from the Supreme Court on at least twenty-one different occasions”); Fred Barbash
& Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration Is Constantly Losing in Court, WASH.
POST (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-real-reasonpresident-trump-is-constantly-losing-in-court/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5bb51b7ff322e9_story.html [https://perma.cc/AUF4-CJZV] (“Federal judges have ruled against the
Trump administration at least 63 times over the past two years, an extraordinary record of legal
defeat that has stymied large parts of the president’s agenda on the environment, immigration and
other matters.”).
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House rarely consulted on the most controversial policies. Notably,
certain agencies, such as the State Department, have been consistently
sidelined, whereas other agencies such as Homeland Security have been
given primary responsibility for carrying out new policies, but not
necessarily equivalent policymaking clout.
A second pattern, related to the first, has been the reorganization of
executive branch bureaucracies that oversee immigration and refugee
policies. Sessions initiated efforts during his tenure to assert the Attorney
General’s prerogative over the work of immigration law judges (ILJ),
whose existence can be traced to Article I of the Constitution rather than
Article III. Sessions took away powers from ILJs that they used to delay
deportation proceedings or administratively close them in order to keep
families together.87 Using the same authority, Sessions’s successor
William Barr later determined that any alien transferred from an
expedited removal proceeding after establishing a credible fear of
prosecution or torture “is ineligible for [release on] bond,” so must be
held indefinitely.88 In the past, these tools were used by ILJs to keep
families intact and reduce suffering by deportable aliens while
proceedings continued.
An office that has helped pair immigrants with pro bono counsel in the
past has also been reshuffled, with the potential effect of limiting access
to legal information and assistance on the part of migrants facing
deportation.89 According to a new interim rule, an office of policy will
have authority to make precedent for ILJs, and the Director of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review will have authority to render
an appellate decision when cases are not decided within a certain period
of time.90 Most recently, Attorney General Barr has moved to decertify
the immigration law judges’ union.91 Thus, in all of these ways, the
87. Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271, 272 (A.G. 2018) (emphasis added) (holding that
“immigration judges and the Board do not have the general authority to suspend indefinitely
immigration proceedings by administrative closure.”).
88. Matter of M-S-, 27 I&N Dec. 509, 510 (A.G. 2019).
89. Alan Pyke, Shakeup of Immigration Court System Threatens Migrants’ Due Process,
THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 23, 2019), https://thinkprogress.org/shakeup-of-immigration-courtsystem-threatens-migrants-due-process-7ffae9cab289/ [https://perma.cc/4FGB-FZGR] (“The
regulations concern the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), where the work of
applying immigration laws to individual human cases gets done. In addition to burying the legalassistance work in a team Trump created, the rule endows EOIR’s director with vast new power to
change how the immigration laws are applied.”).
90. Colleen Long & Amy Taxin, DOJ Making Changes to Agency that Runs Immigration
Courts,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Aug.
23,
2019),
https://www.apnews.com/
1e2188552a724b14b23739f1a8595fc3 [https://perma.cc/Y78W-R788].
91. Richard Gonzalez, Trump Administration Seeks Decertification of Immigration Judges’
Union, NPR (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/12/750656176/trump-administration-

544

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 51

administration has harnessed the powers of the Attorney General to
reorganize existing bureaucracies with the goal of reducing their ability
to impede the president’s new immigration policies.
Third, there is a broadening of law enforcement as a tool for social
policy across key domains such as immigration and refugee policy. Both
in rhetoric and practice, Trumpism returns to a Nixonian lawenforcement tilt, which reflects a greater comfort with using force to
solve a wider array of social problems—from race relations to the cultural
and demographic makeup of this country. Barr has largely been a force
for continuity given his strong commitment to an expansive theory of
executive authority,92 even if Sessions had been more openly committed
to an ethno-nationalist vision of America. But whereas in other areas the
primary goal has been “deconstruction of the administrative state,”
especially in terms of the nominees chosen to lead a department, the
attorneys general have been notable outliers by possessing an expansive
view of federal authority to deal with migration.
While he served as AG, Sessions routinely gave speeches to law
enforcement castigating past immigration policy as “lawlessness” and
seeking to inculcate sheriffs, state troopers, district attorneys, and
attorneys general with a nationalist vision where demographic control is
the responsibility of every law enforcement officer on the ground. As
Sessions told a gathering of law enforcement officers in California,
America admits “the highest numbers [of legal immigrants] in the
world.”93 This was an “unprecedented rate” he warned, and asked law
enforcement to buy into the white anxiety driving a central tenet of
Trumpism: “we will soon have the largest percentage of non-native born
in our nation’s history.”94 During this gathering, he asked police to
presume unauthorized migrants to be a danger to officers themselves:
“Think about the officers knocking on a door to execute a warrant. They

seeks-decertification-of-immigration-judges-union [https://perma.cc/XL6W-KG9X].
92. Barr has staked out a particularly strong version of the “unitary executive” theory, where a
president cannot corruptly abuse a power given to him by the Constitution. This view was outlined
in an unsolicited letter to Deputy AG Rod Rosenstein in which Barr complained about Mueller’s
special counsel investigation, and this view formed the basis for his decision as AG that the
president could not be prosecuted for obstruction of justice. Eli Watkins, Barr Authored Memo Last
Year Ruling Out Obstruction of Justice, CNN (Mar. 26, 2019, 6:31 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2019/03/24/politics/barr-memo-mueller/index.html [https://perma.cc/4YGL-FTT8].
93. Jeff Sessions, Remarks at 26th Annual Law Enforcement Legislative Day Hosted by Cal.
Peace Officers’ Ass’n, Sacramento, C.A. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-26th-annual-law-enforcement-legislative-day
[https://perma.cc/SG4Q-E6R7].
94. Id.
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don’t know what’s on the other side.”95 In Las Cruces, New Mexico, he
announced the president’s “zero tolerance policy toward illegal entry.”96
He explained the ideological basis for this shift in policy: “The United
States of America is not an idea . . . [it’s] a nation.”97
The Trumpian vision of immigration regulation demands lock-step
participation by state and local authorities, even though the principle of
federalism limits how much the administration can strong arm
jurisdictions that refuse to cooperate. Even the mostly symbolic
declarations by certain jurisdictions they are “sanctuary cities” for
undocumented immigrants is a threat to this vision of total mobilization
against migration. To this administration, any disagreement with its
immigration policy violates federal law. Sessions put his point in
alarming terms: “Cities, states, and counties that knowingly, willfully,
and purposefully release criminal aliens back into their communities are
sacrificing the lives and safety of American citizens in the pursuit of an
extreme open borders policy.”98
A fourth strategy entails ratcheting up criminal sanctions and other
repercussions. The “rule of law” approach to immigration builds on
earlier efforts to criminalize the mere existence of undocumented
migrants in the United States and magnifying the consequences of
unlawful entry. As it has been widely reported, the Trump administration
is consciously redesigning American immigration policy purely through
executive action to maximize whatever deterrence value it can wring
from enforcement policy and rule changes to alter the rates and patterns
of migration.
Most experts who study migration say that a complex array of factors
affect when people decide to leave their home countries in search of a
better life, from economic and political stability to natural disasters.99
Trumpism’s “zero tolerance” strategy is focused entirely on the alleged
“pull factors,” trying to not just dry up economic opportunities for
95. Id.
96. Jeff Sessions, Remarks on Immigration Enforcement, Las Cruces, N.M. (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-immigrationenforcement [https://perma.cc/25FQ-HMEQ].
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See JoAnne D. Spotts, U.S. Immigration Policy on the Southwest Border from Reagan
Through Clinton, 1981–2001, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J 601, 602 (2002) (“The primary ‘push’ factors
are poor living conditions, high levels of unemployment, poverty, political unrest, overcrowding,
and government oppression in the alien’s home country.”); Gerald P. Lopez, Undocumented
Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 623–
26 (1981) (outlining key factors that influence an undocumented worker’s decision to come into
the United States illegally).
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migrants but also to increase the pain associated with efforts to cross the
southern border—even when such efforts are entirely legal, say, to seek
asylum under federal and international law. Separating children from
parents and other family members at the border, denying education and
benefits to undocumented children, and even a reported effort to
withdraw from the Flores Settlement Agreement so the administration
can return to indefinite detention of families, are all part of the same
tapestry.100
Fifth, a new problem now emerges from assertive presidential action
and modest institutional blowback, which is substantive spillover: an
expansion of emergency-based governance and unilateral action across a
host of areas. This includes the travel ban, foreign trade, the border wall,
and other areas involving immigration and refugee policy. For the most
part, the Trump administration’s lawyers have deftly exploited
limitations in the ways courts function to advance their objectives. They
have come to expect unfavorable rulings from lower courts. While the
president rails against those judges to rally his supporters and try to
influence judges, his lawyers have at times strategically withdrawn
appeals and rewritten policies to increase the odds of a victory before
higher courts. This approach led the third version of Trump’s promised
Muslim travel ban to be upheld narrowly by the Supreme Court even
though crucial changes had been made (i.e. excluding permanent
residents, deleting the so-called “Christian preference” desired by
evangelicals, and dropping a few countries from the list).101
At a key moment in Trump v. Hawaii, the majority of justices refused
to read the Immigration Act’s nondiscrimination principle to apply to
national security decisions suspending entry for a class of nonimmigrants,
even when those classes are defined by country of origin.102 The
majority’s reading of the law is inconsistent with the 1960s settlement
insofar as the reading treats the non-discrimination provision added in
1965 as regulating a wholly “different sphere”—visas as opposed to
admission. But this reading of immigration law reduces the egalitarian
principle to nothing more than the decisions made by low-level
bureaucrats charged with visa determinations. At the same time, it
presumes that Congress wanted a president to have otherwise broad
power to bar the entry of immigrants, even for discriminatory reasons.
100. Shear & Kanno-Youngs, supra note 16.
101. See generally ROBERT L. TSAI, PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED
NATION 1–6, 74–80 (2019); see also Peter Spiro, How the Courts Could See Their Way to Striking
Down the Trump Travel Ban, LAWFARE (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-courtscould-see-their-way-striking-down-trump-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/3Q2F-FFVE] (stating that
“the order serves no counterterrorism purpose” and ”[r]efugees are the most vetted of immigrants”).
102. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408–10 (2018).
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That seems inconsistent with the broader goals of the Immigration Act,
which broadly attacked assumptions of cultural incompatibility and
animus against foreigners. It is also obvious from legislative debates that
using country of origin could, in some instances, violate the precepts
animating the Immigration Act. Contrary to the Court’s approach, it
simply isn’t possible to do justice to that law without meaningful
consideration of a president’s motive and some empirical inquiry of a
presidential policy.
A great deal also seemingly hinges on whether the president’s action
to suspend entry from certain Muslim-majority countries is truly
temporary. If that’s a sham and it is actually an indefinite ban, the policy’s
subversion of the 1960s settlement is even more striking.103
Apart from the doctrinal aspects of the case, the president and his
supporters have tried to build on this victory in two ways: rhetorically, by
claiming broadly that his unilateral actions have now been endorsed by
the Court; and substantively, by giving often weak empirical
justifications on behalf of other unilateral moves, such as his decision to
reallocate military funds to build a border wall that Congress refuses to
fund. For a populist-autocrat, the absence of significant resistance to
unilateral action is treated as a license to keep going and expand the areas
for emergency governance and/or solo action.104
Some of the administration’s policies entail treating migrants from
certain parts of the world—i.e. Central and South America and the
Middle East—differently from migrants that come from other parts of the
world. The question is whether this differential treatment is justified by
something legitimate that distinguishes these regions or countries, or
whether they are instead founded on bigotry or otherwise unsupported
assumptions.
On October 4, 2019, President Trump signed a proclamation invoking
the identical INA provision § 212(f) used to keep out Muslim travelers to
do something new unilaterally: keep out immigrants who can’t
demonstrate in advance they are “covered by approved health
103. Id. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the 5-4 majority went on to decide the constitutional
issues. After confining the principle of nondiscrimination to visas only, he then took an exceedingly
deferential approach to the Equal Protection Clause due to the assertion of national security. On
that score, the majority found a way to brush aside all evidence of anti-Muslim motivation, from
repeated sentiments expressed by President Trump and his policy makers, as well as the fact that
upwards of 97 percent of the populations of the affected Middle Eastern countries were Muslim.
See TSAI, supra note 101, 74–75 (suggesting that it was not coincidental that the president’s ban
singled out populations from countries with 97 percent of the population belonging to the Muslim
faith).
104. See generally Robert L. Tsai, Manufactured Emergencies, 129 YALE L.J. FORUM 590
(2020).
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insurance.”105 This is a major departure from past usages of a president’s
emergency power to suspend the entry of foreigners. It doesn’t seem to
be geared toward a problem limited in scale but rather entails
policymaking of significant scope. This single act of presidential
adventurism is projected to slash legal immigration by a whopping 65
percent if it goes into effect.106
In a sense, we might be witnessing a mutation of Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s one hundred-day strategy of swamping the field of action and
daring opponents to respond, while expecting a number of losses but
“winning” with the public by creating the overall impression of furious
activity on behalf of “the people.” One difference is that the ratio of
executive actions to legislative successes has seemingly become
lopsided. Another apparent difference has been the sustained length of
time that a president has tried to go alone on any particular issue without
significant institutional pushback. Further study of this phenomenon is
warranted to assess whether the current norms-breaking style of throwing
up far-reaching policies against the wall and seeing what sticks is an
aberration or a sign of things to come.
To be sure, the structural incentives in favor of unilateral action have
never been stronger for a populist-autocrat, given the lack of
repercussions so far from either Congress or the Supreme Court. Unlike
during the early part of the New Deal, there has been no shot across the
bow from the high court, other than the notable decision in the surprising
census case that suggests that, at least in certain contexts, manufacturing
rationales could be a problem in the future.107 Perhaps most troubling of
all, the Court’s decision to insulate partisan gerrymandering from judicial
review on political question grounds sends the signal to a populistautocrat that deeply anti-democratic measures are simply matters to be
fought out through ordinary politics.108 The Court will soon have more
opportunities to weigh in on other matters of democratic decline, such as
the anti-corruption features of the Constitution. Whether the Judiciary
will rise to the occasion or remain on the sidelines have an impact on
democracy’s continuing fortunes in America.
105. Proclamation No. 9945 on the Suspension of Entry of Immigrants Who Will Financially
Burden the U.S. Healthcare System, in Order to Protect the Availability of Healthcare Benefits for
Americans, 84 Fed. Reg. 53,991, 53,992 (Oct. 4, 2019).
106. Nicole Narea, Trump Just Quietly Cut Legal Immigration by Up to 65%, VOX (Oct. 9,
2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/10/9/20903541/trump-proclamation-legal-immigration-healthinsurance [https://perma.cc/7W3P-5SPN].
107. Dep’t. of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019) (ruling that the
justification that the government offered for including the citizenship question on the 2020 census
was just a pretext).
108. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2018) (“We conclude that partisan
gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”).
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One bright spot is the level of unintended transparency about legal
changes: there seems to be more governmental actors willing to leak
details about troubling initiatives, and among some public servants to
draw a line in the sand and speak up even if they resign. This dynamic of
internal bureaucratic testing and conscience-based decision making has
enhanced the ability of people outside of government to expose the
ideologies and plans behind unilateral actions. It’s too sporadic to call it
a true resistance. Yet thus far, we have seen more of the actual rationales
that underlie major executive branch shifts in thinking, which helps
observers to be able to connect the dots between seemingly disparate
executive initiatives. That is different from many of the key
transformations that took place within the Bush administration, which
were conducted with far more secrecy.109
To say that these various aspects of unilateral immigration policy are
troubling from the standpoint of the 1960s settlement is not to say that
every single change would be deemed unconstitutional. It is, however, to
recognize that many of the moves are part of the same concerted effort to
gain control over the demographics and culture of this country.
Make no mistake: the grassroots effort to undermine the Immigration
Act’s legitimacy continues. Among the president’s most enthusiastic
early supporters on this issue was Ann Coulter. Her best-selling book,
¡Adios, America!, derides the civil rights era as “the most destructive
period in American history.”110 She singles out the Immigration Act’s
“premise” for special scorn and likens it to a bizarre belief of a weird
hippy cult: “The poor of the world have the right to come to America, and
we have to take care of them!”111 It will take some effort to ensure that
such attitudes, which informs the administration’s approach, do not skew
immigration policy in a lasting fashion.
III. PRESUMPTION OF EQUALITY, CULTURAL COMPATIBILITY AND
FAMILY UNITY
There are flaws with Trumpism’s claim to popular sentiment for
undermining the 1960s settlement. First, Trump did not win the popular
vote in 2016, and Hillary Clinton’s nearly three million-vote margin
makes that deficit the largest for an Electoral College winner in

109. For an excellent account of the 9/11 transformations, see JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE:
THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS
(2009). See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007).
110. COULTER, supra note 12, at 17.
111. Id.
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history.112 Accordingly, it is difficult for Trump to claim either a mandate
or institutional consensus for the most radical features of his agenda. This
does not by itself make any particular policy illegitimate, but it does
warrant skepticism about majoritarian support for his initiatives when he
acts alone. He may be acting within a reasonable scope on questions that
are not well settled, but by expressing animus against refugees or
Muslims or presuming that immigrants represent group threats, he is
taking direct aim at deeply held principles without sufficiently broad and
deep support.
Second, since many of his immigration measures emerge from the
playbook of anti-immigration activists, the policies and objectives
themselves come from the margins of the president’s own party. These
organizations have tried to take those policies mainstream through their
expanded access to the White House, but it remains uncertain how
popular those policies truly are if the president is unwilling to test them
by doing the hard work of legislative governance. Indeed, his plan to
reallocate military funds to build a border wall and his plan to separate
minor children crossing the border from parents are disfavored by a
majority of Americans.113 Even members of his own party have
denounced some of the policies.114
Third, while past presidents who won a close race tried to govern by
moving towards the center, Trump has bucked that received wisdom by
constantly tending to his base rather than seeking common ground with
the opposing party, and then hoping that he will be rewarded electorally
for maintaining the impression of tireless battle against the status quo.
His anti-consensus leadership style certainly exploits the eroding
democratic conditions that he found, but acting alone raises concerns that
112. Benjamin Kentish, Donald Trump Has Lost Popular Vote by Greater Margin Than Any
US President, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 12, 2016), https://independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/uselections/donald-trump-lost-popular-vote-hillary-clinton-us-election-president-historya7470116.html [https://perma.cc/6SCS-6BAE].
113. Steven Shepard, Poll: Majority Still Opposes Trump Emergency Declaration, POLITICO
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/13/trump-national-emergency-poll1218483 [https://perma.cc/9SRN-HFXG]; Stop Taking the Kids, 66 Percent of U.S. Voters Say,
Quinnipiac University National Polls Finds; Support for Dreamers Is 79 Percent, QUINNIPIAC
POLL (June 18, 2018), https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=255 [https://perma.cc/
8X23-DR9Q].
114. Jeff Cirillo, Here Are the Republicans Opposing Migrant Family Separation, ROLL CALL
(June 19, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/republicans-opposing-migrant-familyseparation [https://perma.cc/3QVH-HNSA] (“Sen. Bob Corker . . . of Tennessee joined 11 senators
in urging Attorney General Sessions to ‘halt’ the administration’s policies leading to family
separation while Congress works to deliver a lasting immigration fix.”); Laura Bush, Separating
Children from Their Parents at the Border ‘Breaks My Heart’, WASH. POST (June 17, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/laura-bush-separating-children-from-their-parents-atthe-border-breaks-my-heart/2018/06/17/f2df517a-7287-11e8-9780-b1dd6a09b549_story.html
[https://perma.cc/WFP2-9YMN] (“[T]his zero-tolerance policy is cruel . . . .”).
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even when the president gets his way, his action may be an antidemocratic outcome or else violate deeply-held notions of how the
constitutional order should operate.
So, what, if anything, should we take to be the normative consequences
of acknowledging the Immigration Act of 1965 as an achievement every
bit as important to the constitutional order as the traditional civil rights
laws? While it’s certainly no panacea, recovery of the statute’s
extraordinary status could help deepen and diversify efforts to protect the
crucial values associated with its enactment. Legislation, judicial rulings,
and popular rhetoric from a multiplicity of sources could deepen that
historical insight and prevent further erosion of fundamental principles
by populist-autocrats. Recovering the Immigration Act’s history as part
of the civil rights revolution also presents lawyers and judges with the
material they need to convince others of the need to construe statutes so
as to facilitate legislative goals and the empirical evidence so as to deter
pernicious motives.
First, the principles of antidiscrimination and family integrity ought to
be broadly presumed to run through the entirety of the Immigration Act.
These principles should not be cabined to purely ministerial acts by
bureaucrats but should instead have some broader constraining effect
upon enforcement and policy decisions. The principles might act slightly
differently depending on a particular dispute, and depending on the
statute invoked, but wholesale disregard of them would seemingly violate
the terms of the 1960s settlement. In areas like derivative citizenship, too,
the equality norm should be more robust than it is at the moment. For
now, the Court has been willing to afford more protection to visa
determinations than invocations of national security-based exclusions,
leaving only deferential constitutional protections. But where the Court
has currently drawn even that line, and how judges evaluate the evidence
of animus or cultural incompatibility, could be adjusted based on this
historical knowledge.
Closely related to the non-discrimination norm in the immigration
domain is a strong presumption of cultural compatibility. Its antithesis—
the older assumption that people from certain countries were
categorically incapable of assimilation and political loyalty—has been
explicitly repudiated as part of this political settlement as racist and
contrary to empirical practice. This should mean that enforcement actions
or policies that are based on such broad assumptions, rather than other,
legitimate grounds, should not be permitted to stand.
Not every usage of country-of-origin as a criterion will transgress these
precepts. That category is still used in per-country limitations as well as
for imposing application procedures on countries believed to be
problematic. Where there is a sound empirical basis for using the criteria,
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government officials should have no trouble doing so. But where countryof-origin serves merely as a proxy for racial animus or false cultural
stereotypes, usage of that criteria to the detriment of newcomers offends
the notion of equality or cultural compatibility. 115
Second, although I have focused on the 1960s, these principles are not
an entirely new product of that decade of political mobilization. Rather,
they consisted of efforts to revive older notions of equality, freedom, and
family reunification that emerged during the Reconstruction period.
Kerry Abrams, for instance, detects language about a “natural right” to
family unity in some cases that allowed family members to join existing
relatives in America even without the proper papers.116 More work can
be done to underscore those linkages across political settlements, but the
fact that these principles have a stronger historical pedigree and
jurisprudential grounding should be part of the equation. They are
fundamental values and should not be brushed aside as the musings of
left-wing globalists.
Third, and this has the most impact for a populist-autocrat: any actions
taken by later presidents, when they are done without the explicit
approval of Congress, would be presumptively illegitimate insofar as they
are inegalitarian or disregard the norm of family integrity. This point
could have profound consequences for the current administration’s “zero
tolerance” approach, which (1) may be characterized as broadly treating
certain migrants differently based on hatred or disgust for them, or
grounded in sweeping racial or cultural stereotypes and (2) has not been
explicitly authorized by Congress. The president and his foot soldiers in
the anti-immigration movement have repeatedly praised people and
cultures from Nordic countries, while assuming the worst about the
inhabitants and cultures of those from other parts of the world, such as
Haiti, Africa, and El Salvador.117 Such sentiments may serve as evidence
of animus, but they may also reflect a categorical rejection of the
presumption of cultural compatibility embodied in the Immigration Act.
It may be possible to urge even stronger legal protections to defend the
law from unauthorized repeal or piecemeal adjustment, though doing so
would take more space than I have here. For instance, one might claim
115. For a deep dive into how some states use sweeping nationality in ways that offend equality,
see Tally Kritzman-Amir & Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Nationality Bans, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 563.
116. Kerry Abrams, Family Reunification and the Security State, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 247,
255–58 (2017) (discussing In re Chung Toy Ho, 42 F. 398 (C.C.D. Or. May 23, 1890) and United
States v. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459, 466–68 (1900)).
117. Jen Kirby, Trump Wants Fewer Immigrants from “Shithole Countries” and More from
Places Like Norway, VOX (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/1/11/16880750/trumpimmigrants-shithole-countries-norway [https://perma.cc/5NH5-QXUS].
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that the Immigration Act deserves to be accorded status as a “superstatue.” Bill Eskridge and John Ferejohn have argued that such a law is
an ambitious one that:
(1) seeks to establish a new normative or institutional framework for
state policy and (2) over time does “stick” in the public culture such that
(3) the super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a
broad effect on the law—including an effect beyond the four corners of
the statute.118

A law that qualifies as a super-statute should be construed “liberally and
purposively,” the two contend.119
For Eskridge and Ferejohn, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the
quintessential super-statute because it “embodies a great principle
(antidiscrimination), was adopted after an intense political struggle and
normative debate and has over the years entrenched its norm into
American public life, and has pervasively affected federal statutes and
constitutional law.”120 They make no mention of the Immigration Act of
1965. The first two conditions seem to be satisfied, though more work
would have to be done to establish that the Immigration Act has to a
similar degree influenced governance in the institutional and normative
sense that they describe. If so, the idea is that normatively, other doctrines
should bend to facilitate the faithful application of a law rendered during
a moment of intense popular mobilization.
To say that the Immigration Act of 1965 is part of the civil rights
revolution is not to say that changes to immigration law can never be
made. That would be absurd. Instead, it is simply to point out that the
Immigration Act shares certain core principles embodied in other
landmark laws. It also underscores that any changes to the essential
character of immigration law and enforcement policy should come from
Congress, while claims of populist presidents to embody the wishes of
the people when acting alone should be treated with skepticism.
How far this legal transformation goes will depend upon what
upcoming national elections bring, how federal judges react to the raft of
lawsuits against the administration, and how firmly and cleverly the
Democratic Party defends the precepts of the 1965 Immigration Act
against the challenge of Trumpism. Trump’s almost certain impeachment
in the wake of explosive revelations that his allies sought foreign
assistance to harm a political rival will weaken him, while emboldening

118. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 5, at 1216.
119. Id. at 1249.
120. Id. at 1237 (footnotes omitted).
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institutions willing to resist his efforts, but not necessarily put an end to
executive-based innovation in policymaking.121
In broad strokes, as Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq point out, democracy
in America remains at risk of “constitutional retrogression” given
Trump’s “hostility to the institutional predicates of democracy.” 122
Trump’s removal from office would not be sufficient to repair the damage
done; nor will it fix overnight the way institutions like the Department of
Justice and the State Department have been disfigured by partisan and
personal interests. What happens from here on out will tell us how
durable our existing political settlements are. History tells us that there is
always a period of institutional and popular resistance, as there should be,
when a social movement or figure comes to power with visionary
objectives. But that period of resistance varies, and when reformers push
far enough for long enough, institutional resistance will end and become
adaptation, as courts and other legal actors come to accept the terms of a
new constitutional baseline.
We should assume that the same dynamic that weakens institutional
resistance over time to populist leaders will respond in largely the same
way by eventually accommodating populist-autocrats. On the other hand,
democratic backsliding can still be reversed—or at least norms of
governance can theoretically be returned to a pre-crisis state if
intervention through election or some other change of power occurs. The
Democrats’ flipping the Senate would ordinarily be a crucial change if it
were to occur, but even if that institutional shift were to occur, Congress
as a whole would still have to be able to overcome the vetoes of a
populist-autocrat.
The basic point, however, remains: How we see the civil rights
revolution, and what we do to keep it intact, is entirely up to us.

121. See Jennifer Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance from Below, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE &
COMMENT (Nov. 16, 2016), https://yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-byjennifer-nou/ [https://perma.cc/YHY3-LF48] (cataloguing covert and overt tactics used by civil
servants to defy their superiors).
122. Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV.
78, 163–64 (2018).

